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i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether civil claims against a website operator
were properly dismissed under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230,
where they sought to hold the website liable for
publishing content posted by third parties, and for
editorial decisions about publishing and prohibiting
content.
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RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
Pursuant to Rule 29.6 of the Rules of the
Supreme
Court
of
the
United
States,
Respondents make the following disclosure:
Backpage.com, LLC is a Delaware limited
liability company that is a subsidiary of and owned
by several other privately held companies,
respectively: IC Holdings, LLC; Dartmoor Holdings,
LLC; Atlantische Bedrijven C.V.; Kickapoo River
Investments, LLC; Lupine Investments LLC; and
Amstel River Holdings, LLC. No publicly held
corporation owns any interest in Backpage.com, LLC
or its parent companies.
Camarillo Holdings, LLC, is owned by Leeward
Holdings LLC, which is owned by Medalist Holdings
Inc. Each of these entities is privately held, and no
publicly held corporation owns an interest in any of
them.
New Times Media, LLC is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Voice Media Group, Inc. No publicly
held corporation owns an interest in either company.
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INTRODUCTION
This case involves a straightforward application
of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act,
which precludes suits against interactive computer
services for content provided by third-party users.
In the two decades since Congress enacted Section
230, hundreds of cases have interpreted the law in a
manner consistent with Congress’s intent to foster
free speech on the Internet and to encourage online
providers to self-police content rather than face
potentially crippling liability. The First Circuit’s
decision affirming dismissal in this case comports
with the “near-universal agreement that Section 230
should not be construed grudgingly.” As courts have
observed for 20 years, Section 230 was intended to
prevent the “obvious chilling effect” that would occur
if websites were held liable for third-party content,
given the enormous amounts of such content posted
online every day. App. 10a (quoting Zeran v. Am.
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997)).
The First Circuit, in its unanimous panel opinion
(joined by former Justice Souter, sitting by designation), correctly concluded that dismissal in this
case was “rooted in positive law,” and “fits comfortably” within established Section 230 precedent. App.
3a, 14a. It is undisputed that the online ads giving
rise to petitioners’ claims were created, developed
and posted by third-party users, not Backpage.com.
The First Circuit correctly held that petitioners’
arguments to impose liability on Backpage.com for
these ads were merely attempts to “end run” Section
230, which did “not cast the slightest doubt” on the
conclusion that dismissal was proper. App. 20a.
This too is entirely consistent with Section 230 case
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law holding that plaintiffs may not evade Section
230 by artful pleading.
The Petition for Certiorari misconstrues the
decision below and attempts to invent disagreement
among the circuits where none exists. Petitioners
contend the First Circuit decided that websites are
immune from liability whenever “content created by
a third party was a part of the chain of causation
leading to the plaintiff’s injury.” Petition at 11. The
First Circuit said no such thing. Rather, it held that
Petitioners’ claims amounted to an attack on
Backpage.com’s editorial decisions and practices,
which the uniform case law holds that Section 230
protects.
Petitioners’ assertion that the Ninth
Circuit “explicitly rejected the First Circuit’s view,”
Petition at 13, both relies on this mischaracterization of the First Circuit’s decision and misconstrues the few cases that have denied Section 230
immunity based on circumstances entirely different
from this case.
The Petition for Certiorari raises no issue that
warrants review by this Court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Section 230 of the CDA

“By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal
immunity to any cause of action that would make
service providers liable for information originating
with a third-party user of the service.” Zeran, 129
F.3d at 330.
Section 230(c)(1) states:
“No
provider … of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). Section 230 expressly
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preempts all civil claims and all state-law claims
whether civil or criminal. Id. § 230(e)(3) (“[N]o
liability may be imposed under any State or local law
that is inconsistent with this section.”).
Congress enacted Section 230 to achieve two
goals. First, it “wanted to encourage the unfettered
and unregulated development of free speech on the
Internet, and to promote the development of
e-commerce.” Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co.
v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 n.3 (10th Cir.
2000) (Section 230 is meant “to promote freedom of
speech”); 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (statute intended to
“preserve the vibrant and competitive free market
that presently exists for the Internet”). Second, it
sought to encourage online providers to “self-police”
for potentially harmful or offensive material by
providing immunity for such efforts. Batzel, 333
F.3d at 1028; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
As courts interpreting Section 230 have
uniformly held, the statute reflects a “‘policy choice
… not to deter harmful online speech through the …
route of imposing tort liability on companies that
serve as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially
injurious messages.’” Universal Commc’n Sys. Inc.
v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 2007)
(quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31). Congress
sought to eliminate the “obvious chilling effect” that
such liability would cause, “given the volume of
material communicated through [the Internet], the
difficulty of separating lawful from unlawful speech,
and the relative lack of incentives to protect lawful
speech.” Id. at 418-19 (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at
331). “Section 230 therefore sought to prevent
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lawsuits from shutting down websites ….” Batzel,
333 F.3d at 1028.
Thus, courts have consistently interpreted
Section 230 to establish immunity for online
providers, as the First Circuit held in this case:
“There has been near-universal agreement that
Section 230 should not be construed grudgingly.”
App. 10a; see also id. 11a (noting the “broad
construction accorded to section 230” resulting in the
“capacious conception of what it means to treat a
website operator as the publisher or speaker of
information provided by a third-party”). Nine other
circuit courts have interpreted Section 230 the same
way, recognizing the broad immunity and protections it provides.1 Hundreds of reported decisions
have intepreted Section 230, and “[a]ll but a handful
… find that the website is entitled to immunity from

Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31; Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 985 n.3;
Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003);
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (9th
1

Cir. 2003) (noting a “consensus” that “§ 230(c) provides broad
immunity for publishing content provided primarily by third
parties”); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321
(11th Cir. 2006) (“federal circuits have interpreted [§ 230] to
establish broad federal immunity to any cause of action that
would make service providers liable for information originating
with a third-party user”) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010)
(same); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008)
(“Courts have construed the immunity provisions in § 230
broadly ….”);Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under
Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008);
Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398,
406-07 (6th Cir. 2014); Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354,
1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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liability.” Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 558
(N.C. Ct. App. 2012). And for its part Congress—far
from disavowing Section 230 as the courts have
interpreted it—has extended the statute to preempt
the enforcement of certain foreign judgments. App.
44a (citing 28 U.S.C. § 4102(c)(1)).
B.

Petitioners’ Claims Against
Backpage.com

Backpage.com operates an online classified
advertising service through which users can post ads
in a range of categories. App. 4a. The website is
organized geographically by state and municipality.
Id.; see also Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F.
Supp. 2d 805, 813 (M.D. Tenn. 2013). Users post
millions of ads every month, making Backpage.com
the second-largest online classified ad service in the
country, after Craigslist. Backpage.com, LLC v.
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1266 (W.D. Wash.
2012).
Petitioners (plaintiffs below) alleged that pimps
trafficked them for sex and posted ads about them in
the escort section of Backpage.com. Petitioners
conceded that all of the ads were created and posted
by the pimps (or by Petitioners themselves at their
pimps’ direction). App. 12a. They expressly disclaimed any contention that Backpage.com created
or developed any of the content of the ads. Id. 11a
n.6; see also App. 48a (“the Doe plaintiffs recognize
that defendants did not author the content of the
offending ads”).
Instead, Petitioners alleged (largely in conclusory
fashion) that Backpage.com’s voluntary efforts to
prevent misuse of the site were inadequate and
amounted to a mere ruse to “facilitate” crime. For
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example, Petitioners complained that Backpage.com
did not require phone number verification, that
phone numbers can be displayed in advertisements
in alternative formats, that photographs uploaded
for use in ads were shorn of metadata, and that
users have the option to hide email addresses in
postings. App. 5a-6a. Based on these and other
similar allegations, Petitioners sued Backpage.com
under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. § 1591, et seq.
(“TVPRA”), the Massachusetts Anti-Trafficking Act,
Mass. Gen. Laws c. 265 § 50, and other causes of
action.
C.

Proceedings Below

Respondents (defendants below) moved to dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
arguing that plaintiffs’ claims were based entirely on
harms allegedly incurred from Backpage.com’s
publication of advertisements posted by third
parties—exactly the kind of claims that are
precluded by Section 230.
The District Court
(Stearns, J.), dismissed the action in its entirety.
Petitioners appealed, and the First Circuit
(Barron, Selya and Souter, JJ.), unanimously
affirmed. The panel noted that in enacting Section
230, Congress recognized that websites “may have
an infinite number of users generating an enormous
amount of potentially harmful content, and holding
website operators liable for that content ‘would have
an obvious chilling effect’ in light of the difficulty of
screening posts for potential issues.” App. 10a
(quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331). Accordingly, the
uniform Section 230 case law reflects a “capacious
conception” of what it means to treat a website as a
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publisher of third-party content. App. 11a-12a. The
court recognized that the “ultimate question” does
not depend on how plaintiffs seek to characterize
their claims, but rather on whether the “cause of
action necessarily requires that the defendant be
treated as the publisher or speaker of content
provided by another.” App. 12a (citing cases).
The court found plaintiffs’ argument that their
claims sought to hold Backpage.com liable not for
publishing but for “participation in sex trafficking”
“comprise[d] more cry than wool,” because at bottom,
plaintiffs’ allegations all concern “the formulation of
precisely the sort of website policies and practices”
that Section 230(c)(1) protects. App. 13a. Accordingly, the First Circuit found that “[t]he case at hand
fits comfortably within [Section 230’s] construct” and
that “[p]recedent cinches the matter.” App. 14a.
Petitioners sought rehearing en banc before the
Court of Appeals, which was denied. This Petition
followed.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
I.

THE FIRST CIRCUIT’S DECISION
IS CONSISTENT
WITH
UNIFORM
SECTION
230
CASE
LAW
IMMUNIZING ONLINE PROVIDERS
FOR CLAIMS BASED ON THIRDPARTY CONTENT.

The First Circuit’s decision was directly in line
with the consensus among the circuit courts that
Section 230 precludes claims against websites for
their actions and practices in publishing third-party
content.
Petitioners’ argument that the First
Circuit’s reasoning creates a circuit split is based on
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a misreading of the decision below and a skewed
analysis of Section 230 cases generally.
A.

The First Circuit Did Not Adopt
a “But For” Causation Test.

The First Circuit upheld dismissal of Petitioners’
claims because they expressly sought to hold
Backpage.com “‘liable for its exercise of a publisher’s
traditional editorial functions – such as deciding
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter
[third-party] content.’” App. 10a (quoting Zeran, 129
F.3d at 330). The court explained that appellants’
claims “[w]ithout exception” turned on “Backpage’s
decisions about how to treat postings,” including
such things as “the lack of phone number verification, the rules about whether a person may post
after attempting to enter a forbidden term, and the
procedure for uploading photographs.” It found that
decisions about “the structure and operation of the
Backpage website,” “which reflect choices about
what content can appear on the website and in what
form, are editorial choices that fall within the
purview of traditional publisher functions.” App.
14a-15a.
The First Circuit also correctly noted that its
holding and reasoning is “congruent with the case
law” of the other circuits, which have long held
editorial decisions about third-party content to be
protected under Section 230.
See, e.g., Nemet
Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591
F.3d 250, 257 (4th Cir. 2009) (Section 230 precluded
suit based on the “structure and design” of website);
MySpace, 528 F.3d at 413 (dismissing claim for
alleged failure to protect users of site from sexual
assault by other users, finding claim was another
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way of treating site as the publisher of third-party
posts); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (“[L]awsuits seeking
to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a
publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or
alter content—are barred.”).
In an attempt to invent a disagreement where
none exists, Petitioners mischaracterize the First
Circuit’s reasoning. Petitioners assert the First
Circuit held immunity lies wherever third-party
speech appears in the “chain of causation” of a
plaintiff’s injuries. Petition at 3; see also id. at 11,
13, 14, 15, 18. That is quite plainly not what the
First Circuit held. App. 17a. Rather, in the court’s
own words: “We hold that claims that a website
facilitates illegal content through its posting rules
necessarily treat the website as a publisher or
speaker of content provided by third parties and,
thus, are precluded by Section 230(c)(1),” and “a
website operator’s decisions in structuring its
website and posting requirements are publisher
functions entitled to section 230(c)(1) protection.” Id.
The court nowhere stated or suggested that it
applied Section 230 on some “chain of causation”
theory, as Petitioners assert.2
The First Circuit addressed causation only with regard to
Petitioners’ state-law claim under Massachusetts’s unfair trade
practices statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. For that claim,
Petitioners alleged that Backpage.com had been disingenuous
because it had cooperated with law enforcement authorities,
which “‘minimized and delayed’ any real scrutiny” of the
website, and the continued existence of the website therefore
harmed Petitioners. App. 22a-23a. The First Circuit affirmed
the district court’s decision dismissing the ch. 93A claim, noting
that it was “shot through with conjecture” and “pyramids
2

10
Nonetheless, proceeding from their mischaracterization of the First Circuit’s decision, Petitioners
point to Ninth Circuit cases to allege a conflict with
their invented “but for” causation rule for Section
230 immunity. Those Ninth Circuit cases, however,
are perfectly consistent with the First Circuit’s
actual holding: that claims attacking publisher’s
actions and editorial choices concerning third-party
speech are immunized by Section 230. In Fair

Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008), for

example, the Ninth Circuit held the roommatematching website could not be held liable for usersupplier content in a “comments” field on the
website, despite the plaintiffs’ claims—indistinguishable from those here—that the website and its
features otherwise “encouraged” users to state
discriminatory preferences.3 Id. at 1174. The Ninth

speculative inference upon speculative inference.” App. 23a.
Petitioners do not mention that this is the only portion of the
First Circuit’s decision addressing causation, and they do not
seek certiorari to review the decision of the First Circuit and
the district court that their allegations about this state-law
claim were implausible.
3 Petitioners (at 14) quote a portion of the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Roommates holding that Roommates was not
entitled to Section 230 protection for another part of its website
that required users to provide discriminatory preferences “as a
condition of accessing its service,” because the site thereby
became “the developer, at least in part, of that information.”
521 F.3d at 1166 (emphasis added). Petitioners fail to mention
that they disclaimed any assertion that Backpage.com acted as
a content provider, App. 11a n.4 (noting that “content creation”
argument was “forsworn” by plaintiffs below), such that this
part of the Roommates decision is irrelevant here.
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Circuit observed—again consistent with interpretations of Section 230 across the country—that any
claim that can be “boiled down to the failure of an
interactive computer service to edit or block usergenerated content,” amounts to an attack on the
“very activity Congress sought to immunize by
passing the section.” Id. at 1172 n.32. See also
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir.
2009) (immunity lies where “the duty that the
plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derives from
the defendant’s status or conduct as a ‘publisher or
speaker’”); Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d
846, 852 (9th Cir. 2016) (Section 230 immunizes
websites from claims based on “efforts, or lack
thereof, to edit, monitor, or remove user generated
content.”).
B.

No Circuit Court Has Limited
Section 230 Protections to
“Neutral Intermediaries.”

Petitioners next assert that the First Circuit’s
decision is contrary to a national “consensus” that
CDA immunity is limited to online providers that act
as “neutral intermediaries” of online speech. Not
only does no such “consensus” exist—no federal
appellate court has ever limited Section 230 in the
way Petitioners suggest. To the contrary, the courts
routinely hold that websites are immune from
liability for third-party content even if they
“encourage” or “promote” actionable speech.
Petitioners base their fictional “neutral intermediary” test on passages in a few Section 230 cases
that examine whether a website was responsible for
developing the allegedly actionable content at issue.
For example, in FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d
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1187, 1201 (10th Cir. 2009), the Tenth Circuit denied
CDA immunity not because the website failed some
abstract “neutrality” standard, but because the website operator actually hired and paid researchers to
obtain confidential telephone records illegally.
These actions made it “responsible for the development of the specific content that was the source of
the alleged liability,” and thus potentially liable as
an “information content provider” as defined in
Section 230(f)(3). Id. at 1198 (emphasis added).
Here, Petitioners repeatedly disclaimed the argument that Backpage.com acted as an “information
content provider.” App. 11a. In both the district
court and the First Circuit, they conceded that all of
the content that allegedly led to their injuries was
supplied by third parties. In light of this acknowledgment, the First Circuit declined to address the
argument advanced improperly by some amici
urging that Backpage.com be treated as an “information content provider” so as to avoid the protections of Section 230.4 App. 11a. There is no conflict
between the First Circuit’s opinion, which held that
Petitioners’ claims treated Backpage.com as a pub-

Petitioners’ waiver also renders inapposite the Washington Supreme Court decision in J.S. v. Village Voice Media
Holdings, LLC, 184 Wash. 2d 95 (2015), (Petition at 20), which
was based entirely on the allegation that Backpage.com creates
content. The Washington court held (on a considerably more
lenient pleadings standard than permitted in federal court),
that plaintiffs’ allegations that Backpage.com might be considered an information content provider could survive a dismissal motion. Id. at 103. Petitioners’ assertion that the First
Circuit’s decision “creates a direct conflict with a state court of
last resort” is wrong.
4
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lisher of third-party content because they challenged
publisher functions, and cases such as Accusearch
addressing the issue of whether websites may be
liable for creating and developing content themselves.
Nor do any of the other circuit cases Petitioners
cite impose an all-purpose “neutral intermediary”
limitation on Section 230 immunity. Several, like
Accusearch, address the question of whether a
website’s actions constituted content development,5
the issue eschewed by Petitioners in this case. Some
of the cases referred to websites acting as intermediaries or providing neutral tools (which users
misused to post allegedly unlawful content) in the
course of explaining that Section 230 immunity
applied,6 but none have stated this as a dispositive
test or even a relevant consideration for application

Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1358 (Facebook held immune where
complaint “nowhere alleges or even suggests that Facebook
provided, created, or developed any portion of the content that
Klayman alleges harmed him”); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124
(“that Matchmaker classifies user characteristics into discrete
categories and collects responses to specific essay questions
does not transform Matchmaker into a ‘developer’ of the ‘underlying misinformation’”); Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 983 (America
Online did act as an information content provider outside the
scope of § 230 immunity by providing access to allegedly inaccurate information).
5

See, e.g., Doe v. GTE, 347 F.3d 655, 657-58 (7th Cir. 2003)
(noting that service provider acted in a “passive” manner, but
not holding that “passivity” is a requirement for Section 230
immunity).
6
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of Section 230.7 No circuit court has ever imposed
such a requirement.
In fact, the consensus is the opposite of what
Petitioners assert. Decisions from the circuit courts
(and other courts) have routinely barred plaintiffs
from pleading around Section 230 by alleging a
website “encouraged” actionable third-party content.
In the Jones v. Dirty World case, for example, the
plaintiff sued a gossip website for disparaging
remarks a third-party user posted about her. The
district court refused to apply Section 230 because it
concluded the site “intentionally encourage[d] illegal
or actionable third-party postings,”8 but the Sixth
Circuit reversed. It noted that “[m]any websites not
only allow but also actively invite and encourage
users to post particular types of content” that might
be “unwelcome to others.” 755 F.3d at 414. The
court held, however, that websites cannot be sued on
an “encouragement” theory because that would
“eclips[e] the immunity from publisher-liability that
Congress established.” Id. “Congress envisioned an
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open internet, but the
muddiness of an encouragement rule would cloud
that vision.” Id. at 415 (citation omitted).

In fact, the cases Petitioners cite as supposedly creating a
“neutral intermediary” standard, see Petition at 17-18 n.3, do
not even use this phrase, much less suggest that it is a
requirement for Section 230 immunity. See, e.g., Carafano, 339
F.3d 1119; Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d 980.
7

8

Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 965 F.

Supp. 2d 818, 821 (E.D. Ky. 2013), rev’d, 755 F.3d 398.
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Similarly, in Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174,
the Ninth Circuit rejected arguments that a website
lost Section 230 immunity by implicitly encouraging
unlawful speech. In many cases, the court noted, “a
clever lawyer could argue that something the
website operator did encourage the illegality,” but
such cases “must be resolved in favor of immunity,
lest we cut the heart out of section 230 by forcing
websites to face death by ten thousand duck-bites,
fighting off claims that they promoted or encouraged—or at least tacitly assented to—the illegality of third parties.” Id. at 1174. See also Lycos, 478
F.3d at 420 (“It is, by now, well established that
notice of the unlawful nature of the information provided is not enough to make it the service provider’s
own speech.”).
“[T]here is simply no authority for the proposition
that [encouraging unlawful content] makes the
website operator responsible, in whole or in part, for
the creation ... of every post on the site.” Ascentive,
LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 450, 476
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The First Circuit’s decision is fully consistent with
the consensus of courts across the country that
application of Section 230 cannot turn on whether a
website’s decisions about publishing third-party
content are sufficiently “neutral” or instead allegedly
“encourage” unlawful content. 9

See also, e.g., S.C. v. Dirty World, LLC, 2012 WL 3335284,
at *4 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 2012) (“[E]ncouraging defamatory
posts is not sufficient to defeat CDA immunity.”); Goddard v.
Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(holding Google immune despite allegations it “encourages[,]
collaborates in the development of … and, effectively, requires”
9
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II.

THERE
IS
NO
NEED
TO
“HARMONIZE” FEDERAL STATUTES.

Petitioners also assert the Court should grant
certiorari to “harmonize” Section 230 with the civil
remedy provision of the TVPRA, 18 U.S.C. § 1595.
However, the First Circuit affirmed dismissal of
Petitioners’ claims not because of a conflict between
the terms of two statutes, but because Petitioners’
TVPRA claim sought to treat Backpage.com as a
publisher of third party speech. Petitioners’ claims
are barred by Section 230, and no “harmonization” is
needed.
The TVPRA permits an individual who is a victim
of sex trafficking to bring a civil action against the
perpetrator or one who “knowingly benefits” from
“participation in a venture” which that person “knew
or should have known” violated the statute. 18
U.S.C. § 1595(a). Section 230 provides that an
online provider may not “be treated as the publisher
or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
The First Circuit found no conflict between the
two statutes in this case. It recognized that a
TVPRA claim could conceivably lie against a website
operator if it was “a participant in a sex trafficking

illegal content in ad program); Global Royalties, Ltd. v.
Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 933 (D. Ariz.
2008) (ripoffreport.com immune despite allegations it encouraged defamatory reviews); Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y.,
Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (N.Y. 2011) (enforcing Section 230
immunity despite claims that ShittyHabitats.com “encouraged
users to post negative comments”).
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venture”—for example if “the website operator
helped to procure the underaged youths who were
being trafficked.” App. 16a. But the court observed
that plaintiffs alleged no such thing and, instead,
“the TVPRA claims as pleaded premise[d alleged]
participation on Backpage’s actions as a publisher or
speaker of third-party content,” falling squarely
within “[t]he strictures of section 230(c)” which
“foreclose such suits.” Id.
Plainly, the First Circuit’s fact-bound holding—
that plaintiffs’ second amended complaint does not
allege sufficient facts to demonstrate Backpage.com
acted in any way other than as a publisher of thirdparty content—provides no cause for review by this
Court. It does not point to a “conflict” between
Section 230 and the TVPRA, any more than between
Section 230 and any other federal statute establishing a civil cause of action. Cf. POM Wonderful
LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2239 (2014)
(harmonizing provisions of Lanham Act and federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as they pertain to
drink labeling). Nor could it be said Section 230 and
the later-enacted TVPRA are in such “irreconcilable
conflict” that the TVPRA worked an implied repeal
of Section 230. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379,
395 (2009) (holding implied repeal is found only
where two statutes “are in irreconcilable conflict, or
where the latter Act covers the whole subject of the
earlier one and ‘is clearly intended as a substitute’”)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, there is nothing to reconcile. The TVPRA
allows plaintiffs to bring civil claims against their
traffickers, while Section 230 precludes asserting
such claims against website operators based solely
on their actions in publishing third-party content.
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Petitioners next erroneously claim that nothing
in Section 230 “immunize[s] website operators from
being held civilly liable for conduct that violates
federal criminal law.” Petition at 25. But that is
precisely what the statute does.
Section 230
precludes all civil claims contrary to its protections.10
Its broad prohibition against claims that treat a
website as the “publisher or speaker” of third-party
content is limited only by certain enunciated exceptions, none of which include civil claims based on
federal criminal statutes. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e).
The First Circuit correctly held that the exception
in Section 230(e)(1) for criminal enforcement applies
only to federal criminal prosecutions; it does not
permit private plaintiffs’ civil actions based on
alleged violations of criminal statutes. App. 18a-20a.
The “distinctions between civil and criminal
actions—including the disparities in the standard of
proof and the availability of prosecutorial discretion—reflect a legislative judgment that it is best to
avoid the potential chilling effects that private civil
actions might have on internet free speech.” App.
20a. In this regard, too, the First Circuit’s decision
is consistent with every other federal court that has
considered the issue.11
Section 230 expressly preempts state laws, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(e)(3) (“no liability may be imposed under any State or
local law that is inconsistent with this section”), and also
provides immunity for federal civil claims that would violate
Section 230’s protections of online providers, see, e.g., Chicago
Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights, 519 F.3d at 668-69 (Section
230 precluded claim under Fair Housing Act).
10

See, e.g., Obado v. Magedson, 2014 WL 3778261, at *8
(D.N.J. July 31, 2014) (“[T]he CDA exception for federal
11
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Petitioners also argue their state-law claims
survive because they are “not inconsistent” with
Section 230. Opp. at 23-25. But subsection 230(e)(3)
permits application of laws that, like Section 230,
bar claims based on third-party content. To the
extent Plaintiffs argue Section 230 does not apply
because they are not suing Backpage.com as a
publisher, that is not true (as discussed), and in any
event, this circular logic would render subsection
230(e)(3) meaningless.
III.

THE PETITION RAISES NO LEGAL
ISSUE OF IMPORTANCE MERITING
REVIEW BY THIS COURT.

The Petition does not raise a legal issue of importance for this Court’s review. At bottom, Petitioners’
disagreement is not with the First Circuit’s legal
analysis, which simply applied the plain meaning of
Section 230 to the complaint before it. Rather, their
quarrel is with the scope of the immunity enacted by
Congress. As the First Circuit aptly explained:
Congress did not sound an uncertain trumpet
when it enacted the CDA, and it chose to grant
broad protections to internet publishers …. If
the evils that [Petitioners] have identified are
criminal statutes applies to government prosecutions, not to
civil private rights of action under [statutes] with criminal
aspects.”) (emphasis added); Backpage.com v. McKenna, 881 F.
Supp. 2d at 1275; M.A. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC,
809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1055-56 (E.D. Mo. 2011); Hinton v.
Amazon.com.dedc, LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 685, 690-91 (S.D. Miss.
2014); Goddard v. Google, Inc., 2008 WL 5245490, at *5 n.5
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d
1010, 1017 (Fla. 2001)
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deemed to outweigh the First Amendment
values that drive the CDA, the remedy is
through legislation, not through litigation.
App. 32a. Petitioners’ arguments that the dictates of
Section 230 should give way to their private claims
or their contentions about combatting sex trafficking
are not appropriately addressed to this Court.
Impassioned though they may be, the various
amici curiae supporting the Petitioners add nothing
to alter that conclusion. Some of the amici try, in
vain, to resurrect the long-waived argument that
Backpage.com can be held liable to Petitioners as an
“information content provider.” See, e.g., Brief of
States of Washington, Colorado, et al., at 7-10; Brief
of National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children, et al., at 17-18. However, it is well settled
that an amicus curiae may not promote an argument
renounced by a party. New Jersey v. New York, 523
U.S. 767, 781 (1998) (“[W]e must pass over the arguments of the named amici for the reason that” the
party to the case “has in effect renounced them.”),
judgment entered, 526 U.S. 589 (1999).12
Other amici would have this Court grant
certiorari to drastically restrict the scope of Section
230 in a way that Congress did not intend, and that
no reported decision has ever done. See Brief of
Legal Momentum, et al., at 14-15. Specifically, these
amici maintain that Section 230 immunity is limited

The rule that amici cannot independently present issues
to justify certiorari is uniquely appropriate here, because the
First Circuit refused to address the same arguments of the
same amici offered below. App. 11a n.6.
12

21
to the so-called “innocent” website operator who does
not have “knowledge” that the site is being misused,
with the result that “distributor” liability remains
for a website that has “notice” of harmful content.
But Section 230 contains no such limitation, and this
whole-cloth argument would contradict the uniform
interpretation of Section 230 and Congress’s intent.
As the Fourth Circuit comprehensively explained
in the first appellate decision to apply Section 230(c),
“[l]iability upon notice would defeat the dual
purposes advanced by § 230 of the CDA,” Zeran, 129
F.3d at 333, namely, to protect free speech online
and to incentivize self-regulation. In particular,
since any affirmative steps to screen content could
also potentially put a website on notice of allegedly
actionable postings, “notice” liability would have the
perverse effect of disincentivizing such efforts. Id. at
332-33. See also Lycos, 478 F.3d at 420 (“It is, by
now, well established that notice of the unlawful
nature of the information provided is not enough to
make it the service provider's own speech.”). The
amici supporting Petitioners disagree with this as a
matter of policy, but it is not the province of this
Court to grant certiorari to rewrite the law.
Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984)
(“Courts are not authorized to rewrite a statute
because they might deem its effects susceptible of
improvement.”)
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CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
denied.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT CORN-REVERE
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